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Abstract 
 
The characteristics of the Portuguese stock market suggest that it is susceptible to herding 
behavior. We investigate the existence of this behavior in Portugal during periods of 
market stress, with emphasis on the Subprime and European Sovereign Debt Crises. We 
analyze the overall stock market, key industries, and portfolios divided by market 
capitalization. The study is performed using both linear and nonlinear models, and the 
impact of conditional variance is taken into account. This paper shows evidence of herding 
behavior when the nonlinear model is used and during periods of crisis. Investors imitate 
more assets of similar size than assets of the same industry. Finally, the evidence of 
herding behavior is reduced when GARCH effects are taken into account. 
 
JEL Classification: G02; G15; G14  
 
Keywords: Herding behavior, market stress, Portugal, stock market, crisis, Subprime 
Crisis, European sovereign debt crisis.    
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1.  Introduction  
 
The instability of Financial markets  is a much-discussed topic and many researchers have 
studied its causes and consequences. Some economic theory suggests that prices  
efficiently reflect rational agents' expectations (Scharfstein and Jeremy, 1990). However, 
investors may be forced to negotiate at inefficient prices (Christie and Huang, 1995), due, 
for instance, to group psychology, i.e. herding behavior (Scharfstein and Jeremy, 1990).  
Herding behavior has been studied  studied more intensely in recent years, and it 
is characterized by an investment plan based on the strategy of other investors (Nofsinger 
and Sias, 1999). However, herding may not be intentional, and may be caused by 
correlation of independent behaviors due to information disclosure - "spurious herding" 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). Another phenomenon close to herding behavior is fire 
sales, where investors sell assets at very low prices accumulating huge losses (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2011).  
Herding behavior can lead to an increase in systemic risk, jeopardizing the 
conclusions of basic asset pricing models. In contrast, it may also create investment 
opportunities for investors (Tan et al., 2008). Due to the potential impact of herding, many 
theoretical works attempt  to understand it, notably Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and 
Banerjee (1992). Some authors mention herding behavior as an irrational behavior 
(Christie and Huang, 1995), but some specify it as a rational behavior (Chiang and Zeng, 
2010; Garber, 2000: 5; Scharfstein and Jeremy, 1990).  
The empirical studies on the existence of herding in various countries are 
ambiguous (Christe and Huang, 1995; Chang et al., 2000). Notably, in Southern European 
markets, Economou et al. (2011) found evidence of herding in Greece and Italy, with 
results being less explicit for Portugal. This created the motivation for studying herding in 
the Portuguese stock market. Another motivating reason  is the instability, macroeconomic 
imbalances and structural problems characterizing the Portuguese economy from 2008 to 
2012. Indeed, with the global financial crisis of 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis of 2010, 
market uncertainty and risk has substantially increased (Banco de Portugal, 2012).  
Despite the increase since 1989, stock market capitalization as a proportion of GDP 
in Portugal is smaller than in the euro area (28% and 40% in 2011, respectively). The 
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relatively small size of the stock market (see Table 1 for additional data) is due in part to 
the large number of SMEs and the great importance of banks in the financing of firms. 
Only a small number of firms are listed in the stock market, the concentration of the market 
in the top ten firms is strong, and the liquidity of some stocks is small (IMF, 2006). The 
mutual funds industry is also very concentrated (Gavriilidis et al., 2013b).  
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Moreover, given the small liquidity and high concentration of the Portuguese 
stock market (see Table 1), herding behavior may be more intense than in other 
European advanced markets. In concentrated markets, institutional herding behavior is 
more probable because of more information sharing, greater peer pressure, and better 
knowledge of each others' transactions among mutual funds’ managers (Gavriilidis et 
al., 2013b; Do et al., 2008). 
Also, the average sophistication of non-professional investors in Portugal is 
relatively small, implying a greater propensity for herding behavior (Lux, 1995). Relying 
on these facts, we propose to study the significance of herding behavior in Portugal and 
its connection with crisis periods. Our results are relevant for Portugal and other small and 
very concentrated stock markets that share similarities in market structure, dissemination 
of information and industry structure. Using market returns and CSAD data, Mobarek et 
al. (2014) find that Portugal belongs to the cluster of PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece and Spain) that has characteristics distinct from the Nordic and 
continental countries.  
Even though Economou et al. (2011) have already studied herding behavior in 
Portugal, the present study goes further by carrying out  a study by industries (Financials, 
Industrials and Consumer Service); dividing assets in portfolios with different 
capitalizations (studying the possibility of herding concerning the homogeneity of market 
capitalization); and contrasting linear and non-linear models of herding behavior. We also 
contribute to the literature by conducting an analysis of the effect of the subprime and 
sovereign debt crises, and by incorporating GARCH models in the measurement of 
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herding behavior. The latter is particularly important as change in stocks’ volatility across 
time can be mistaken for cross-section variability (Hwang and Salmon, 2004). 
Our results show the prevalence of herding behavior in the nonlinear model, 
especially in crises, but this behavior was not detected with the linear model.  
The present study is organized into five sections. In Section 2 we revise the 
literature; in Section 3 we describe the hypotheses, data and methodology; in Section 4 
we present the empirical results and discussion and finally, in Section 5 we conclude.  
 
2. Literature review  
 
2.1. Herding behavior causes and consequences 
 
The literature not only explains the theoretical aspects that determine herding behavior, 
but presents empirical evidence of this behavior in several national markets. Human 
psychology plays a major role in explaining herding behavior. Using various existing 
theoretical models, Devenow and Welch (1996) argue that the tendency is to imitate the 
behavior of groups because people feel safe in groups. Herding behavior can also be 
analyzed from the perspective of contagion of investor sentiment, with this behavior being 
more common for less sophisticated investors (Lux, 1995).  
 Whether herding is triggered by irrational or rational behavior is an important 
subject to study. Besides physiological factors, information has a very important role. 
Banerjee (1992)’s model notes that participants may ignore their private information and 
mimic the decisions of others, unleashing herding behavior. In turn, Bikhchandani et al. 
(1992), using a model similar to Banerjee (1992), introduces the concept of informational 
cascades.  
 Avery and Zemsky (1998) note the fact that the models of Banerjee (1992) and 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) assume that the price of assets is fixed. Therefore, Avery and 
Zemsky (1998) show that when prices adjust to available information, there is no herding 
behavior. However, they admit that more complex information structures, such as doubt 
or uncertainty about what other market participants know, can trigger herding behavior.  
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 On the other hand, Froot et al. (1992) argue that in the short term, investors tend 
to use the same sources of information, even if these do not describe the fundamentals 
of assets in the best way.  
 Reputation and compensation of analysts and managers can generate herding. 
The key work of Scharfstein and Jeremy (1990) describes that managers tend to mimic 
the decisions taken previously by others to maintain their reputation.  
Maug and Naik (2011) indicate that the reward of funds’ managers based on 
benchmark indexes may be an incentive to herd. Graham (1999), in turn, argues that 
analysts and managers with a high reputation tend to imitate each other due to  fear of 
losing their high yields and status.  According to Boyson (2010), if a manager moves away 
from the consensus behavior in order to maximize compensation, at the expense of a 
larger risk, he may turn out to be responsible for closing down the hedge fund. 
It has been suggested that style investing, in which economic agents, notably 
institutional investors, select stocks based on specific characteristics (e.g. stock 
capitalization and momentum), is a contributory factor for herding (Gravriilidis et al., 
2013b).  
Whereas characteristic herding (investors being attracted by some characteristics 
in stocks – e.g. blue chips stocks, which is similar to style investing) and homogeneity of 
investment professionals (e.g. the same education and social backgrounds) produce 
unintentional herding, informational cascades, reputation and remuneration schemes 
originate intentional herding (Holmes et al., 2013).  
 Herding behavior can be more intense in certain periods. Investors in times of 
uncertainty naturally tend to imitate each other more (Gleason et al. 2004). For Christie 
and Huang (1995), investors acquire greater propensity for mutual imitation in periods of 
market stress, or great volatility. On the other hand, with the awakening of the Asian crisis 
of 1997 (Kim and Wei, 2002) and the recent global financial crisis of 2007/08 (Economou 
et al., 2011), the number of studies on herding behavior in crises increased.  
 Now, let us refer to the main economic repercussions of herding behavior. One of 
the most obvious effects of this behavior is that it may move asset prices away from their 
fundamental values, forcing investors to negotiate at inefficient prices (Christie and 
Huang, 1995), and questioning many economic models that do not admit the possibility 
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of market inefficiency (Tan et al., 2008). In addition, Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) 
argue that herding can destabilize markets, as well as increase the volatility and fragility 
of the financial system. Dhaene et al. (2012) stresses that herding behavior increases 
systemic risk, speculative bubbles and crashes.  
 Another aspect is that in a market in which herding behavior is accentuated, the 
level of diversification of portfolios decreases, because assets are highly correlated and it 
is necessary to increase the number of assets in a portfolio to achieve the same level of 
risk diversification (Economou et al., 2011; Dhaene et al., 2012).  
 In short, herding negatively influences markets in several ways, generating 
behaviors that produce instability and inefficiencies, and may even provoke panic. 
 
2.2. Main methodologies and empirical studies   
 
Since the 1990s, many models were proposed to study and analyze herding behavior in 
financial markets. One of the methodologies to analyze herding behavior was developed 
by Lakonishok et al. (1992) and applied to the US investment funds, with the conclusion 
proving the existence of herding behavior. Using this methodology for Portugal, Lobão 
and Serra (2007) concluded that, over the period from 1998 to 2000, there was significant 
evidence of herding behavior with regard to funds from the UK and USA.  
 Kim and Wei (2002) examine the South Korean market before and during  the Asian 
crisis, between 1996 and 1998. Using a methodology based on momentum trading, or 
trading feedback, they found that the non-resident foreign investors are more likely to herd 
through positive feedback trading, due to lack of information on the local market.  
 Hwang and Salmon (2004) studied the presence of herding in the South Korean 
market and in the US using a methodology that measures the relative dispersion of assets’ 
betas, from 1993 to 2002. They concluded that herding occurs in relation to the market 
portfolio. This study indicates that the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998 
pushed markets to equilibrium, refuting the evidence that pointed to an increase in herding 
in times of crisis (see Chiang and Zeng, 2010, for this latter argument).  
 Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000) analyze herding behaviour 
through the dispersion of assets’ returns. The measure in the former study is based on 
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the cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD) and uses a linear model, while the latter 
study uses the cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD) and a non-linear model.  
 Christie and Huang (1995) analyze the US economy, including the NYSE and 
AMEX markets, from 1925 to 1988, and concluded that in periods of market stress, the 
dispersion of returns tends to increase, as predicted by the rational asset pricing model, 
contrary to the idea of herding behavior.  
On the other hand, Chang et al. (2000) studies the U.S., Hong Kong, Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan markets, inferring that in the U.S., Hong Kong and Japan there was 
shown no herding behavior, whereas in the emerging economies of South Korea and 
Taiwan there was evidence of that behavior. The analysis by stock market capitalization 
confirms the results based on the overall sample.  
 The works of Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000) inspired other 
works. For example, Chen et al. (2003) evaluated the behavior of investors in the Chinese 
stock market in 1996-2002, based on the CSSD methodology and modelling conditional 
variance with GARCH models. In this study they confirmed the existence of herding 
behavior in the Chinese stock market, and it was concluded that this behavior is more 
prevalent in shares that can be traded by foreigners (Type B shares). They argue that 
herding is explained by foreigners’ lack of information, as Kim and Wei (2002) concluded 
for the South Korean market.  
 Tan et al. (2008) also studied the Chinese market from 1994 to 2003 with the CSAD 
methodology. They concluded that the herding phenomenon occurs, although, contrary 
to Chen et al. (2003), there is no distinction between type A and B shares. 
 In a recent study, Demirer et al. (2010), analyzed the herding behavior in the 
emerging market of Taiwan. This work is interesting because it compares different 
models. They not only presented the two methodologies based on individual returns of 
assets, CSSD and CSAD, but also  the methodology of Hwang and Salmon (2004), based 
on the relative dispersion of assets’ betas. For the period from 1995 to 2006,  researchers 
show that in 18 sectors, there was no evidence of herding in the linear model, except for 
the electronics sector. With regard to the non-linear model, and with the methodology of 
Hwang and Salmon (2004), herding was prevalent in all sectors, supporting Chang et al 
(2000)’s findings that herding exists in the Taiwanese market. This proves that the results 
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depend on  the model used, justifying the use of two models (linear and nonlinear) in the 
present paper.  
 Chiang and Zeng (2010) using the CSAD methodology, presented a study on 
herding in the financial markets of 18 countries from 1988 to 2009. The results revealed 
the existence of herding in all Asian and developed countries, except in the USA. This 
evidence did not confirm the results of other studies which show that herding is more 
prevalent in emerging markets.  
 Some studies on herding behavior have already been conducted in Portugal. For 
example, Gavriilidis et al. (2013b) investigate mutual funds demand for stocks using Sias 
(2004) methodology; they find evidence of persistence in institutional demand, mostly due 
to herding, which does not disappear when investment styles are taken into account. The 
evidence of persistence in demand is found before and after the credit crisis (January 
2008 – June 2011).  
 Holmes et al. (2013) study herding behavior in Portugal using the same 
methodology as Gavriilidis et al. (2013) and between January 1998 and December 2005. 
They conclude that herding existed among fund managers and the evidence under 
different market conditions is consistent with intentional herding for reputational reasons, 
remuneration and/or informational cascades. Similarly, Gavriilidis et al (2013a) find that 
the Spanish fund managers in most industries herd intentionally for information and 
career-related reasons.  
 Due to the global financial crisis of 2008, some European countries entered into 
serious difficulties. Economou et al. (2011) analyzes herding in Portugal, Italy, Greece 
and Spain from 1998 to 2008. They reveal that, in Greece and Italy, there was evidence 
of herding, while in Portugal the evidence was mixed, that is, it only existed when weighted 
returns were used. On the other hand, there was no herding in the Spanish market. This 
study also proves that the financial crisis of 2008 did not intensify the herding in those 
countries. Mobarek et al. (2014) also find that although the 2008 financial crisis and the 
euro zone crisis did not intensify herding in the Portuguese stock market, there is evidence 
of this behavior during periods of negative market return for the entire sample. 
However, this study considers a limited crisis period, not covering the 2010 sovereign 
debt crisis that substantially affected domestic financial markets. Thus,  causing  the need 
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to analyze  not only the subprime crisis, but also the sovereign debt crisis in this present 
paper, in order to assess whether herding behavior was more intense over crises in 
Portugal.  
Economou et al. (2015) study the sovereign debt crisis for Euronext exchange group 
markets (Portugal, France, Belgium and the Netherlands); they conclude that herding 
behavior was present in Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands during the crisis, but it 
was explained by the dynamics of the two largest markets (France and Netherlands) and 
not by domestic factors. Additionally, the authors conclude that joining Euronext led to the 
emergence of herding in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and to an intensification 
of this behavior in Portugal.  
The study of crises periods is important because there is no agreement on the effect 
of crises on herding behavior (Economou et al, 2015). For instance, according to Kim and 
Wei (2002), in the Asian crisis of 1997, foreign investors were feedback traders (buying 
when the market rises and selling when the market falls), systematically ignoring the 
fundamentals. Chiang and Zheng (2010) find that crises trigger herding behavior in the 
US and Latin American markets, but do not have a significant effect on this behaviour in 
other markets. Mobarek et al. (2014) finds that during crises herding behavior emerges in 
several countries (France, Italy, Spain, and Germany) where it was otherwise absent. 
Herding is more significant in continental and PIIGS markets during the 2008 financial 
crisis, and more important in Nordic countries during the euro zone crisis. In turn, Tan et 
al. (2008) showed that China's shareholders did not exhibit herding behavior during the 
Asian crisis, and Hwang and Salmon (2004) reach  the same conclusion for the South 
Korean and US markets in the Asian and Russian crises.  
 
 
3. Hypotheses, methodology and data 
 
3.1. Hypotheses  
 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the existence of herding on the Portuguese stock 
market (NYSE Euronext Lisbon). This will be done for the market as a whole and for 
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sectors (PSI Financials, PSI Industrials and PSI Consumer Services) using two distinct 
methodologies, a linear one and a non-linear one, whilst also incorporating  the 
modelization of conditional variance (GARCH models). The study is limited to these three 
sectors due to the fact that the other sectors of NYSE Euronext Lisbon do not include a 
sufficiently large number of firms to make a robust analysis of herding.  
Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested is that there is empirical evidence of 
herding behavior in Portugal ( ). Even though this hypothesis was already tested in other 
papers (Gavriilidis et al., 2013b; Holmes et al., 2013) and some use the same 
methodology (Economou et al., 2011; Mobarek et al, 2014), in this paper we control for 
the change in volatility across time and stress the impact of crises.  
Herding may not be detected in the index covering all assets (PSI General), but it 
may exist by sector (Christie and Huang, 1995). Instead of taking the overall market as 
reference, investors may herd around firms that share common characteristics, notably 
from the same industry. Therefore, a sub-hypothesis is that herding behavior is stronger 
in some specific sectors ( ). Some industries have less herding because of stricter 
regulation (Christie and Huang, 1995) or a larger proportion of foreign shareholders 
(Demirer et al., 2010). Gavriilidis et al. (2013a) identify intentional herding in two of the 
main Spanish sectors, and suggest that this occurs because fund managers with less 
information are more concerned about their reputation when investing in the key sectors. 
These authors also find herding in the technology sector, which is characterized by 
medium-sized companies with higher risk, and they suggest that herding in this sector 
aims to reduce risk. Demirer and Kutan (2006) suggest that in China non-financial sectors 
may be subject to more herding than the financial sector because of firms with smaller 
capitalization and a smaller presence of institutional investors. Nevertheless, Demirer and 
Kutan (2006) do not find the presence of herding in any sector.  
Our second hypothesis is that the evidence of herding behavior is more intense for 
stocks with smaller market capitalization ( ). Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) suggest 
that there is a higher prevalence of imitation when investors and assets are similar 
(Lakonishok et al., 1992). Style investing based on specific stock characteristics, such as 
size is one reason for this (Falkenstein, 1996). Consequently, we divided all shares into 
three portfolios according to market capitalization, following Chang et al. (2000).  
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There are theoretical arguments both for and against hypothesis two. On one hand, 
we expect herding to be more prevalent in stocks with smaller capitalization because they 
are characterized by the availability of less information and by smaller liquidity. Information 
cascades, whereby investors follow others because of their superior information, are more 
likely in small securities (Wermers, 1999). On the other hand, herding may be more 
intense for stocks with larger capitalization if this phenomenon is driven by reputation and 
compensation reasons (Theriou et al., 2011) or by correlated information – investigative 
herding (Wemers, 1999).  
For Taiwan, Hsieh (2013) finds that both institutional and individual investors herd 
more in small capitalization stocks, but the behavior is driven by different reasons. Theriou 
et al. (2011) conclude for the Greek market that mutual fund managers herd essentially in 
large capitalization stocks or in stocks belonging to the most visible indices, leading them 
to conclude that reputation is a driver of herding. Similarly, Fang et al. (2013) find for 
Taiwan that dealers herd more in relation to large capitalization securities; they argue that 
this suggests institutional herding is explained by correlated information. Finally, Chang 
et al. (2000) obtain different results for different markets: in Taiwan and South Korea there 
is herding in stocks with large and small capitalizations, but it is only found in Japan in the 
largest capitalization stocks.  
The test of Hypothesis Two allows to correct a bias in testing herding. Indeed, small 
stocks may react differently from large stocks to market conditions and, thus, create 
dispersion in returns – especially when equally-weighted indicators of herding are used 
(Chang et al., 2000). If herding is found in the overall market as well as in small stocks, it 
strengthens the evidence in favor of herding.  
The final hypothesis is that the subprime (2008) and sovereign debt (2010) crises 
exacerbated herding in Portugal ( ). This hypothesis stems from the fact that some 
authors argue that herding can be more pronounced in times of crisis (Kim and Wei, 2002; 
Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Mobarek et al., 2014). As herding is more intense when there 
is more volatility and market stress (Gleason et al., 2004; Kim and Wei, 2002), we define 
the hypothesize that herding may be more prevalent in periods of crisis. Mobarek et al. 
(2014) argues that in a crisis herding may be influenced by both domestic and international 
factors like the wakeup call hypothesis, flight to quality, liquidity, and risk premium 
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changes. The exit of foreign investors during a crisis may be associated with herding 
behavior.  
 
3.2. Methodology   
 
3.2.1. The linear model 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, we use two distinct empirical models, the linear and the 
non-linear models. The linear model of herding behavior (Christie and Huang, 1995) is 
based on cross standard deviations of returns:  
 
 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 = √
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛−1
                                                                                        (1) 
  
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the share’s 𝑖 return, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represents the simple average of all 𝑛 
shares’ returns. As mentioned above, the arithmetic average of returns overweight stocks 
with small market capitalization causing biased results. For this reason, as an alternative 
alternative we also use in formula (1) the weighted average returns, computed as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖,𝑡        (2) 
 
Where 𝛿𝑖 1 is the weight of company 𝑖 in the market.  
According to the rational asset pricing model, during periods of large volatility in 
asset prices, the dispersion of prices increases, whereas with herding, the dispersion 
tends to decrease. To test this hypothesis Christie and Huang (1995) use the following 
equation:  
 
 𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡
𝐿 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑡
𝑈 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                           (3) 
                                            
1   The method of obtaining 𝛿𝑖 will be discussed in Section 3.  
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𝐷𝑡
𝐿 = 1 if the market return on day t is at the lower end of the distribution of returns,  
otherwise 0. 
𝐷𝑡
𝑈 = 1 if the market return on day t is at the upper end of the distribution of returns, 
otherwise 0. 
  
The upper and lower extremes of the return distribution are obtained from a 1% or 5% 
percentile of market returns. 2 If coefficients 𝛽1 and/or 𝛽2 are positive and statistically 
significant, this indicates the validity of the rational asset pricing model, but if they are 
negative and statistically significant, it indicates herding behavior in the market.  
 
3.2.2. The nonlinear model  
 
An alternative model is the nonlinear model (Chang et al., 2000) and is based on the cross 
standard absolute deviation of returns: 
 
            𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =
∑ |𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑅𝑚,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
                                                                                        (4) 
 
 As above, we consider simple average and weighted average returns by asset 
capitalization. The CSAD alone cannot detect herding behavior, instead this behavior is 
detected by the relationship between CSAD and asset returns. Therefore, we use the 
following equation for the market (or industry): 
 
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2𝑅𝑚,𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                  (5)             
 
 The CSAD may have a non-linear relationship with returns that is captured by 𝛾2. 
If the rational asset pricing model is correct, the relationship between the CSAD and 
                                            
2 We choose the 1% and 5% percentile of market return to capture extreme up or down movements in the market. For 
example, a negative return below the 1% percentile is a strong decline in the market – one that occurs on less than 
1% of the days. 
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market return will be linear, i.e.  𝛾2 = 0 (Chang et al., 2000). On the other hand, when 
there is evidence of herding, the coefficient 𝛾2 is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating a non-linear relationship. In this case, the CSAD increases with the market 
return, but at a decreasing rate, reflecting the fact that for higher yields the dispersion 
increases less due to herding.  
The CSAD model can accommodate asymmetric behavior when the market rises 
or falls (Economou et al., 2011):   
 
           𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2(1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+ 𝛾4(1 −
𝐷𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+ 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                               (6) 
 
 The dummy (𝐷𝑢𝑝) assumes value 1 when returns are positive. When the two 
coefficients that capture the nonlinear relationship between returns and dispersions, 𝛾3 
and 𝛾4, assume negative and statistically significant values, there is herding behavior. And 
in this case, if 𝛾4<𝛾3 it means that herding behavior is more prevalent in the days when 
the market is falling. Additionally, a WALD test is carried out to check the equality between 
coefficients 𝛾3 and 𝛾4. Thus, for a p-value larger than 10%, we accept the null hypothesis 
that the prevalence of herding is equal in both periods (market rise and market fall) - if the 
coefficients (𝛾3 and 𝛾4)  are negative and statistically significant. This equation uses the 
entire sample for estimating a single regression, unlike Chang et al. (2000) that separately 
estimate a regression for market rise and market fall.  
In order to answer hypothesis 3, regarding the exacerbation of herding in crises, 
we considered two dummies, 𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒  for the Subprime crisis and 𝐷𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛  for the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, we present the following regression:  
  
𝐶𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝐷
𝑢𝑝|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾2(1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)|𝑅𝑚,𝑡| + 𝛾3𝐷
𝑢𝑝(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+ 𝛾4(1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+ 𝛾5𝐷
𝑢𝑝𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+  𝛾6(1 −
𝐷𝑢𝑝)𝐷𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+ 𝛾7𝐷
𝑢𝑝𝐷𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+ 𝛾8(1 − 𝐷
𝑢𝑝)𝐷𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2
+ 𝜀𝑡                           (7)                                                      
 
 When one or more coefficients 𝛾5 to  𝛾8 is negative and statistically significant, we 
have to check (for each pair) using a Wald test if the full non-linear effect is zero in the 
16 
 
respective crisis, (for example: 𝐻0: 𝛾3 + 𝛾5 = 0 for the Subprime crisis during a period 
when the market is rising). When the null hypothesis is rejected (and the respective sum 
of coefficients is negative), we conclude that herding is more intense for the period (market 
rise or fall) in the crisis (Subprime or Sovereign).  
 
 
3.2.3. Linear and nonlinear models incorporating the GARCH model for the 
conditional variance  
 
Usually, the variance of the error term in regressions for financial data is not constant over 
time and has volatility clusters. So it becomes essential to model the variance of the error 
using GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic) models. 
Consequently, comparing the models CSSD and CSAD with and without the GARCH 
methodology is an interesting issue to study. The works that compare the estimated CSAD 
model with and without the GARCH methodology, found no large differences in results 
(Demirer et al., 2010; My and Truong, 2011), becoming a point of interest to test if the 
same happens in Portugal and for the CSSD model.  
 However, before estimating models using the GARCH methodology, it is necessary 
to confirm whether the data is appropriate for  the intended analysis: there is no 
autocorrelation and there are ARCH effects in residuals. When the existence of 
autocorrelation of residuals is present (as assessed by the LM Test with 10 lags), the box-
jenkins methodology will be adopted in order to remove such effects (introducing the 
necessary MA and AR element in the equation of returns). The optimal number of 
processes (ARMA) is selected through the Schwarz selection criterion. On the other hand, 
we perform the LM ARCH Test -with  𝑞 = 5 -  to test the existence of ARCH effects, where 
rejecting the null hypothesis confirms the existence of ARCH effects.  
After estimating the chosen GARCH model, the adequacy of the model needs to 
be assessed through diagnostic tests. We expect that after the estimation of the GARCH 
model the errors  show neither autocorrelation nor ARCH effects. The GARCH model (1,1) 
is usually sufficient to capture the volatility clustering in the data, but when this is 
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insufficient, we choose the GARCH model (𝑝, 𝑞) with the lowest value in the selection 
criterion Schwarz.  
 On the other hand, financial data generally features leptokurtosis, and residuals 
are not normal. To accomodate this characteristic we use a matrix of variances-
covariances heteroscedasticity-consistent (Bollerslev-Wooldridge).  
 
3.2.4. Data and sample characterization  
 
We use the database of Dathis NYSE Euronext Lisbon to obtain daily data of the closing 
price of shares of 73 companies listed on the Portuguese market from 2/1/2003 to 
31/12/2012. 3 As previously mentioned, the focus of the present study is on the analysis 
of the PSI Geral (73 assets), PSI 20 (33 assets) – (this combines the 20 largest companies 
in the market), PSI Financials (13 assets), PSI Consumer Services (18 assets) and the 
PSI Industrials (20 assets). The constitution of each index obtained in the Bloomberg 
database corresponds to the last day of each year and encompasses all companies that 
were under negotiation on  that day, even if they abandoned the market later (dead 
stocks). Finally, we gathered 2,564 daily observations for each index (1,812 for the PSI 
Industrials).  
 The returns of each company i in period t was calculated as:  
  
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ln(𝑝𝑖,𝑡) − ln(𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1) = ln (
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
)                                                                 
 
 Where 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 represent the closing price in periods 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1, respectively.  
For the assets not traded on a given day, the return is null.  
 Given that the estimation can be affected by outliers (Economou et al., 2011), we 
eliminate all returns larger than 50% (in absolute terms).  
                                            
3 The exception is the PSI Industrials, where the period considered is from 5/12/2005 to 31/12/2012, because the 
number of assets, three, present in this index before the initial period referred to was insufficient to perform an adequate 
analysis. 
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 To estimate the linear and non-linear model, we use the weighted returns and the 
average returns of the market. The method of calculating the average market return is 
based on the simple arithmetic average (Christie and Huang, 1995; Chang et al., 2000). 
In this way, in formulas (2) and (4) average returns are obtained as:  
 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
𝑁
                                                                                                          . 
  
Where  𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represents the average return of the market in period 𝑡, while 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
corresponds to the individual return of company i in the same period, and 𝑁 represents 
the total number of companies in the index.  
 The method of calculating weighted returns (used in formulas (2) and (4)) requires 
the number of shares of each company (from Bloomberg). With this information and the 
closing price of shares, we have:  
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡                                                 
 
 Consequently, the total market capitalization of the index corresponds to: 
 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡 = ∑ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1                        
  
 The weight that asset i has in the index in period t is:   
 
 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡
                                                                             
 
, and the sum of weights of all companies for period 𝑡 is 1.  
Finally, the companies listed in PSI Geral were divided into three distinct portfolios, 
according to market capitalization. Following Chang et al. (2000), and considering the 
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market capitalization of the last day of the year, we grouped stocks in groups according 
to their market capitalization. 4 
Portfolio 1 comprises the first third of companies with the lowest market 
capitalization of the market, while Portfolio 2 includes the second third of stocks in terms 
of market capitalization, and Portfolio 3 concerns the third of companies with the highest 
market capitalization. The weighted and average returns for each Portfolio (Portfolio 1, 2 
and 3) need to be recalculated, and this is done on a daily basis, for the different indexes 
as above. 
 
4.  Results and discussion  
 
 
Now, we are going to analyze the linear and nonlinear models of herding with the goal of 
answering the research hypotheses. Firstly, applying the ADF test to the CSSD and CSAD 
series (simple and weighted averages) results reveal that they are stationary for all sectors 
and portfolios. 5 
 
 
4.1. Empirical evidence of herding behavior (hypothesis 1)  
4.1.1. The linear model  
 
In order to answer the first hypothesis we begin by analyzing the linear model (equation 
(3)) estimated with OLS (Table 2). Dummy variables assume the value 1 for the extreme 
                                            
4 The market capitalization of a company on the last day of the year determines in which portfolio it will belong during 
the following year. An exception is made for the year 2003 in which, due to the lack of data, we considered the market 
capitalization of the first day of the year. 
5 Results available on request.  
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values, both superior and inferior, using a distribution of returns of 1%6 or 5% 7. To correct 
the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity present in financial data, we use the 
methodology proposed by Newey-West, which provides consistent coefficients.  
 
[insert Table 2 around here] 
 
 Analyzing Table 2 we conclude that for all sectors, both with average returns (Panel 
A) and weighted returns (Panel B), the estimated parameters are positive and statistically 
significant at 1%. These results validate the theory of rational asset pricing, which argues 
that in periods of market stress, returns’ dispersion increases.   
 The estimation of the linear model using the GARCH methodology and weighted 
returns is in Table 3 and divided into three panels.8 The test results needed to fulfill the 
conditions for the estimation of GARCH models are in Panel A, the estimated coefficients 
using GARCH models are shown in Panel B, and finally, the diagnostic tests of the 
GARCH model are in Panel C. 
 
[insert Table 3 around here] 
 
We observe in Panel A that for all sectors it was possible to "remove" the 
autocorrelation. We realize that there are no ARCH effects for PSI 20, so the estimation 
of the GARCH model is not necessary in this case. Yet, we accept the null hypothesis (p-
value>5%) for the other sectors, and so the estimation is done through the GARCH model 
in these cases. Diagnostic tests with GARCH modelization reveal the absence of 
autocorrelation and GARCH effects (Panel C).  
                                            
6 For example, extreme returns for the PSI Geral on the positive end are above 1.901% and on the negative end are 
below -2.661%. 
7 For example, extreme returns for the PSI Geral on the positive end are above 1.179% and on the negative end are 
below -1.485%. 
8 Note that in the above estimations we have already corrected the standard errors for the existence of autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West correction type). However, financial series have extreme heteroscedasticity, with 
volatility clusters that are best modeled by GARCH models. 
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 The coefficients (βL and βU ) are positive and statistically significant (Panel B). This 
model, both for weighted returns and for average returns, is consistent with the validity of 
the theory of rational asset pricing model, like the results in Table 2. 9  
 
4.1.2. The nonlinear model  
 
The nonlinear model (equation (5)) is presented in Table 4 - average returns (Panel A) 
and weighted returns (Panel B). Results are extremely different from the linear model: 
there is evidence of herding in both panels in the PSI Geral. These results are similar to 
Economou et al. (2011) for Portugal, which found the existence of herding with weighted 
returns, but did not confirm the same for average returns. The divergent outcome in 
relation to average returns may be explained by a different sample period.  
 
[insert Table 4 around here] 
 
 There is also evidence of herding for PSI 20 in both Panel A and B at 1% of 
significance. For PSI Financials, we note that on Panel A the coefficient 𝛾2 is negative and 
statistically significant at 1%, while in Panel B it is also negative but statistically significant 
only at 10%. Regarding PSI Industrials, there is clear evidence of herding with average 
returns (in Panel A), but when considering weighted returns (Panel B), there is no 
evidence of herding (although 𝛾2 is negative). The results tor PSI Consumer Services are 
also ambiguous: in Panel A there is evidence against herding, whereas in Panel B we 
prove the existence of herding (𝛾2  is negative and statistically significant at 5%).  
 In summary, concerning the non-linear model, we observe that there is significant 
evidence of herding both with average and weighted returns, especially for PSI Geral, PSI 
20 and PSI Financials.  
 
The nonlinear model allowing for asymmetric effects of returns  
                                            
9 Results available upon request for average returns.  
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The nonlinearity identified may result from the fact that the dispersion of returns has 
different behaviors when the market rises and when the market falls. Therefore, in Table 
5, we present the estimate of the CSAD nonlinear model (equation (6)) by OLS allowing 
for asymmetric effects of returns.  
 
[insert Table 5 around here] 
 
 There is evidence of herding in the up market and down market at 1% significance 
in PSI GERAL, with both average and weighted returns. The estimated results suggest 
that there is larger prevalence of herding in periods of down market, as 𝛾3>𝛾4. 
10  
 Results show the existence of herding in Panel A for the up market in PSI 20, 
however, there is no significant coefficient in the down market.11 In Panel B, herding is 
significant in the up and down markets, but more pronounced in the latter (𝛾3>𝛾4).  
 We found negative and statistically significant coefficients at 1% for PSI Financials 
in up and down markets periods in Panel A, with a larger incidence of herding in times of 
market fall (𝛾3>𝛾4) – but the difference between coefficients is not statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficients suggest that there is no evidence of herding in panel B. 
 There is a tendency for herding in the down market for PSI Industrials in Panel A, 
but not in Panel B. In turn, herding is significant at 10% for PSI Consumer services in 
periods of up market both in Panel A and B, but the same is not valid for the down market.   
 In conclusion, we confirm the existence of herding with asymmetric effects of 
return, and observe that results differ depending on whether average returns or weighted 
returns are considered. This is with the exception of the PSI GERAL and PSI Consumer 
Services that registered the same statistical results with both types of returns. This 
highlights that the use of weighted returns reduces the evidence of herding, notably at the 
sector level. This indicates that small capitalization stocks may be explaining the existence 
of herding, especially in sectors where the number of stocks is smaller.   
 
                                            
10 The coefficients are statistically different at 10% significance only for the model with average returns – Table 5.  
11 The coefficients are statistically different at 10% significance – Table 5.  
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The nonlinear model with conditional variance (GARCH) modelling 
 
Let us now present the results pertaining to the non-linear model incorporating conditional 
variance modelling and eliminating the autocorrelation through AR and MA components. 
This is the most suitable model because it explores the non-linearity in the data and is 
less affected by outliers (Economou et al., 2011); in addition, it controls for GARCH effects 
in the residuals – OLS is not an appropriate estimation technique with these effects. Table 
6 indicates that when average returns (Panel B1) are used in the model, PSI Geral and 
PSI Industrial show signs of herding with a significance of 5%. PSI Industrial includes 
manufacturing and construction firms, which together make the largest industry in terms 
of production (26.8% of total production 12). In this case, as suggested by Gavriilidis et al. 
(2013a) herding may be justified because investors are particularly concerned about the 
effect on their reputation of investments in this industry, as it is the largest industry in the 
economy.    
 
 
[insert Table 6 around here] 
 
These results may be skewed due to the use of average returns, because they give 
too much importance to companies with small market capitalization, not authentically 
reflecting the market characteristics (Economou et al., 2011).  Thus, in Panel B2 we use 
weighted returns, only observing herding behavior in PSI 20 at 10% level of significance. 
Table 7 shows the results for weighted returns with a model allowing for asymmetric 
effects, and shows herding behavior in PSI 20 for up market with a significance level of 
5% (the same occurs with average returns 13). There is no evidence of herding in the other 
indexes. The consideration of weighted returns only changed the conclusion on herding 
for the PSI Industrial. However, the impact of considering weighted returns was larger 
when we used OLS; this indicates that small firms played an important role in the tests for 
                                            
12 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística. 
13 Results available upon request. 
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herding with OLS. But when we correct for GARCH effects, the small firms, which usually 
have larger return volatility, have a smaller effect on the conclusion on herding.  
We do not confirm herding behavior around industry average. Even though there 
is evidence of herding in all industries when we use OLS with average returns, this 
disappears when the more suitable model with GARCH effects is used for weighted 
returns. That is, when the weighted returns are considered with GARCH models, herding 
only exists in PSI 20 for the up market, suggesting that modeling the volatility leads to less 
evidence of herding (compared with the results of Table 5). These results refute the 
evidence demonstrated by some researchers (for example My and Truong, 2011) that the 
GARCH modelization of residuals does not change the evidence of herding.  
 
[insert Table 7 around here] 
 
 
4.2. Herding behavior according to market capitalization (Hypothesis 2) 
 
After analyzing results by sector, it is now important to test the existence of herding 
according to the similarity of market capitalization. The goal is to analyze if herding occurs 
in assets with similar capitalizations and whether companies with smaller market 
capitalization show a different behavior, because the level of information about them is 
lower. To a certain extent, this was already done when we analyzed PSI Geral and PSI 
20, because the latter index includes the largest companies.  
To analyze the different capitalization levels, we divide all assets into three different 
portfolios (Portfolio 1, 2, and 3), as explained above. As done for sectors, we estimate the 
linear and non-linear models using the GARCH method to model residuals and weighted 
returns, given that this method offers a better description of the market. In the linear model 
the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant 14, corroborating the 
theory of a rational pricing model, as shown in the results obtained with OLS. 
                                            
14 Result available upon request. 
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Table 8 presents the estimation of the nonlinear model with GARCH variance 
modelization, with asymmetric effects and weighted returns (equation (6)). Results show 
the existence of herding for portfolios in the up market (although only at 10% significance 
for portfolios 1 and 3). In other words, for all portfolios in up market periods there is 
evidence of herding, while for down market periods there is no evidence of herding. Similar 
results are obtained when using average returns.15 Since we find evidence of herding for 
all portfolios, our results do not clarify whether herding is caused by information cascades, 
or by reputation, compensation or correlated information. Nevertheless, the results show 
that herding is also found in the smallest capitalization stocks, giving further support to 
herding behaviour, in line with Chang et al. (2000).   
 
[insert Table 8 around here] 
 
 We summarize the impact of herding on sectors and portfolios for the non-linear 
regression model using equations (5) and (6) in Table 9. Results for the linear model are 
not summarized because all estimated results point towards the nonexistence of herding. 
With the nonlinear model and GARCH effects, we conclude that there is only evidence of 
herding in PSI 20 (up market), as well as in the portfolios organized by size (up market). 
This result demonstrates that herding tends to be more pronounced in groups of stocks 
with similar market capitalization, rather than in those from similar sectors. Note also that 
the fact that herding does not exist in down market suggest that in these periods investors 
tend to be more rational.  
 
[insert Table 9 around here] 
 
 
4.3. Herding behavior in crises periods (hypothesis 3) 
 
                                            
15 Results available upon request.  
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We turn now to hypothesis 3 that indicates that herding is more intense during crises. The 
subprime financial crisis is defined as taking place from 01/08/2007 (Horta et al., 2015) to 
31/12/2008 (Economou et al., 2011). Over this period there is a clear downward trend in 
PSI 20. The period of the sovereign debt crisis is studied from 01/04/2010 onwards, when 
the interest rates of the treasury bonds increased clearly, until 31/01/2012 when the 
interest rates of the treasury bonds reached its maximum of 13.85% and thereafter started 
to decrease. Looking at the evolution of PSI 20 (Graph 1), we observe a sharp decline in 
the index during the subprime crisis followed by a recovery in 2009, which is interrupted 
by a new period of decline at the beginning of 2010. The two crises did not follow 
immediately one another, justifying the study of two separate crisis periods.  
The analysis rests on the PSI 20 and the three portfolios that showed clear 
evidence of herding in average and weighted returns using the GARCH model. Results 
for equation (7) for periods of up and down market are shown in Table 10. 
 
[insert Table 10 around here] 
 
In Panel B, in the Subprime and the Sovereign Debt Crises, the estimated 
coefficients for PSI 20 in the up market are negative and statistically significant. Therefore, 
the assessment to see whether the effect of (𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
2 in crises is negative should be 
performed by testing the hypotheses: 𝛾3 + 𝛾5 = 0 or 𝛾3 + 𝛾7 = 0. However, by using the 
Wald test there is no herding behavior in up market in the sovereign debt crisis (p-value 
= 0.28), while there is evidence of herding in the up market in the subprime crisis (p-value= 
0.00). 
 In Portfolio 1, results point to herding in the subprime crisis in the down market 
(Wald test, p-value = 0.00), but the coefficients related with the sovereign debt crisis are 
not statistically significant. The coefficient allusive to the sovereign debt crisis for the up 
market is negative and statistically significant at 10% for Portfolio 2. In this way, the Wald 
test for  𝛾3 + 𝛾7 (p-value=0.00) suggests that in the Sovereign Debt Crisis herding in 
periods of market rise, exists. Finally, the coefficients regarding the subprime crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis for Portfolio 3 are negative and statistically significant at 1% and 5%, 
respectively, for the up market. However, the Wald test on the coefficients of the sovereign 
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debt crisis indicate that there is no herding in this period (p-value = 0.67). On the other 
hand, for the coefficients of the subprime crisis, the Wald test (p-value = 0.00) shows the 
existence of herding behavior.  
 These results suggest that the sovereign debt crisis and mostly the Subprime crisis 
created herding behavior, contrary to other studies (for example: Economou et al.. 2011; 
and Tan et al., 2008). However, our results are  in line with the model of Avery and Zemsky 
(1998), which defends that uncertainty can produce herding. We must point out that 
outside periods of crises, we did not observe evidence of herding. 16 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
We conclude that there is no evidence of herding behavior in Portugal through the linear 
model using both average and weighted returns (Hypothesis 1). However, with the 
nonlinear model there is evidence of herding behavior in both PSI 20 in the up market and 
in PSI Industrials in the down market, although only in average returns in the latter. We 
argue that the results that deserve more credit are the ones from the non-linear model 
with GARCH modelization, and with this model there is less evidence of herding.  
For the three portfolios organized by market capitalization - Hypothesis 2 -, both in 
average and weighted returns, there is herding when the market generates positive 
returns (up market). This result demonstrates that herding behavior tends to exist for 
groups of stocks with similar market capitalization, and not so much in those groups from 
similar sectors.  
Concerning Hypothesis 3, results with the non-linear model with GARCH effects 
suggest that the PSI 20 suffered from herding in the up market in the Subprime Crisis. In 
relation to the portfolios organized by size, Portfolio 1 registered herding in the down 
market in the subprime crisis; Portfolio 2 registered herding in the sovereign debt crisis in 
the up market; and Portfolio 3 registered herding in the subprime crisis in the up market. 
We conclude that the Sovereign Debt Crisis and mostly the Subprime Crisis produced 
herding in Portugal, especially in the up market. On the other hand, results also show that 
                                            
16 We also tested the effect of crises for the linear model. From these, we found no evidence of herding (these results 
are available upon request).  
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crises gave rise to herding behavior that were absent in periods not undergoing financial 
crises.  
Our results show that Portugal is exposed to herding behavior during periods of 
crisis. This behavior has strong consequences for both investors and regulators, because 
it may intensify crashes, volatility, systematic risk and the fragility of the financial system; 
it deviates prices away from their fundamental values and creates asset bubbles.  
This study concludes that investors should be aware that herding behavior is 
particularly intense during financial crises, and that risk diversification will be smaller at 
these times. More specifically, as herding occurs around firms with similar market 
capitalization, investment in firms with different market capitalizations will provide 
protection against herding.  
Thus, there is the need for tight regulation and legislation to guarantee more 
balanced market outcomes and to prevent systemic risk with considerable impact on 
GDP, unemployment and foreign investment. If herding is explained by fund managers' 
remuneration schemes based on periodic performance assessment on a relative basis, 
regulators, the mutual funds’ industry and investors should take actions to change these 
schemes.  
Regulators should encourage diversification of mutual funds’ investments across 
stocks by market capitalization (small, medium and large). This could be achieved by 
publicizing the correlation between the investments of mutual funds (for the overall market 
and for different groups of stocks’ market capitalization) so that investors in mutual funds 
can take this into account – Gavriilidis et al. (2013a).  
Finally, crises are a contributory factor for herding, with destabilizing consequences 
on financial markets and institutions. This confirms the importance of the EU, international 
institutions and public institutions in general providing more and quicker financial aid and 
taking action in support of affected countries and thus stop the downward financial spiral 
at the outset.  
 
 
 
29 
 
References  
 
Avery, C., Zemsky, P. (1998), “Multidimensional uncertainty and herd behavior in financial 
markets”, American Economic Review, 88, pp.724-728. 
Banco de Portugal (2012), Relatório anual do Banco de Portugal, Lisboa.  
Banerjee, A.V. (1992), “A simple model of herd behavior”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 107 (3), pp.797-817. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., Welch, I. (1992), “A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and 
cultural change as informational cascades”, Journal of Political Economy, 100 (3). 
Bikhchandani, S., Sharma, S. (2000), “Herd behavior in financial markets”, IMF Staff 
Papers, 47 (3), pp.279-310. 
Boyson, N.M. (2010), “Implicit incentive and reputational herding by fund managers”, 
Journal of Empirical Finance, 17, pp.283-299. 
Chang, E.C., Cheng, J.W., Khorana, A. (2000), “An examination of herd behavior in equity 
markets: An empirical perspective”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 24, pp.1651-1679. 
Chen, G., Rui, O.M., Xu, Y. (2003), “When will investors herd? Evidence from the Chinese 
stock markets”, Journal of Financial Research, 37, 2-40. 
Chiang, T.C., Zeng, D. (2010), “An empirical analysis of herd behavior in global stock 
markets”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 34, pp.1911-1921. 
Christie, W.G., Huang, R.D. (1995), “Following the pied piper: Do individual returns herd 
around the market?”, Financial Analysts Journal, July-August, 31-37. 
Dhaene, J., Linders, D., Schountens, W., Vyncke. D. (2012), “The Herd Behavior Index: 
a new measure for the implied degree of co-movement in stock markets”, Insurance: 
Mathematics and Economics, 50, pp.357-370 
Demirer, R., Kutan, Ali M. (2006), “Does herding behavior exist in Chinese stock 
markets?”, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money, 16, pp. 123-
142.  
Demirer, R., Kutan, A.M., Chen, C.D. (2010), “Do investors herd in emerging markets? 
Evidence from the Taiwanese market”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
76, pp.283-395.   
Devenow, A., Welch, I. (1996), “Rational herding in financial economics”, European 
Economic Review, 40, pp. 603-615. 
Do, V., Guo-Sze Tan, M., Westerholm, P.J. (2008), “Correlated Trading in Concentrated 
Market”, Journal of International Finance and Economics, Vol. 8 (4), pp. 148-163.  
30 
 
Economou, F., Kostakis, A., Philippas, N. (2011), “Cross-Country Effects in Herding 
Behavior: evidence from south European markets”, Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions & Money, 21, pp.443-460.  
Economou. F., Gavriilidis, K., Goyal, A.,  Kallinterakis, V. (2015), “Herding Dynamics in 
Exchange Groups: Evidence from Euronext”, Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Money, 34, pp. 228-244. 
Fang, H., Lu, Y.-C., Yiang, T.-Y. (2013), “The decomposition and causes of securities 
dealers’ cascades in the Taiwan stock market”, Investment Management and Financial 
Innovations, 10(3), 30-39. 
Falkenstein, E, (1996), “Preferences for stock characteristics as revealed by mutual fund 
portfolio holdings”, Journal of Finance, 51, pp. 111–135. 
 Froot, K.A., Scharfstein, D.S., Stein, J.C. (1992), “Herd on the Street: informational 
inefficiencies in a market with short-term speculation”, The Journal of Finance, 47(4), 
pp.1461-1484. 
Garber, P.M. (2000), The First Famous Bubbles, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
Gleason, C.K., Mathur, I., Peterson, M.A. (2004), “Analysis of intraday herding behavior 
among the setor EFTs”, Journal of Empirical Finance, 11, pp.681-694.  
Graham, J.R. (1999), “Herding among Investment Newsletters: theory and evidence”, 
Journal of Finance, 54(1), pp. 237-268. 
Gavriilidis, K., Kallinterakis, V., Leite Ferreira, M.P. (2013a), “Institutional industry herding: 
Intentional or spurious?”. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money, 26 (1), pp. 192-214.  
Gavriilidis, K., Kallinterakis, V. & Leite Ferreira, M.P. (2013b), On the Impact of Style 
Investing over Institutional Herding: Evidence from a Highly Concentrated Market. 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 10 (4), pp. 27-42. 
Holmes, P., Kallinterakis, V., Leite Pereira, M. P. (2013), “Herding in a concentrated 
Market: A question of intent”, European Financial Management, 19(3), pp. 497-520.  
Horta, P.J.B., Lagoa, S., Martins, L.F., (2012), “Unveiling investor-induced channels of 
financial contagion in the 2008 financial crisis using copulas”, Quantitative Finance, 
16:4, 625-637.  
Hsieh, S.-F. (2013), “Individual and institutional herding and the impact on the stock 
returns: Evidence from Taiwan stock market”, International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 29, pp. 175-188.  
Hwang, S., Salmon, M. (2004), “Market stress and herding”, Journal of Empirical Finance, 
11, pp.585-616. 
Kim, W., Wei, S.J. (2002), “Foreign portfolio investors before and during crisis”, Journal of 
Internacional Economics, 56, 77-96. 
IMF (2006), “Portugal: Financial System Stability Assessment, including Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Banking Supervision, 
Securities Regulation, and Insurance Regulation”, Country Report 06/378 
31 
 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (1992), “The impact of institutional trading on 
stock prices”, Journal of Financial Economics, 32, pp.23-45. 
Lobão, J., Serra, A.P. (2007), “Herding Behavior: evidence from Portuguese mutual 
funds”, in Gregoriou, G.N. (ed), Diversification and portfolio management of mutual 
fund, Palgrave Macmillan UK, Chapter 8, pp. 167-197.  
Lux, T. (1995), “Herd behavior, bubbles and crashes.” The Economic Journal, 105 (July), 
pp. 881-896. 
Mobarek, A., Mollah, S., Keasey, K. (2014), Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions ans Money, 32, pp. 107-127.  
My, T., Truong, H.(2011), “Herding behavior in an emerging stock market: Empirical 
evidence from Vietnam”, Research Journal of Business Management, 5(2), pp.51-76. 
Maug, E., Naik, N. (2011), “Herding and delegated portfolio management: The impact of 
relative performance evaluation on asset allocation”, The Quarterly Journal of Finance, 
1(2), pp. 265-292.  
Nofsinger, J.R., Sias, R.W. (1999), “Herding and feedback trading by institutional and 
individual investors”, The Journal of Finance, 54 (6), pp.2263-2295. 
Scharfstein, D., Jeremy, S. (1990), “Herd behavior and investment.”, American Economic 
Review, 80, 465–79. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (2011), “Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 80-1, pp.29-48.  
Sias, R.W. (2004), “Institutional Herding”, The Review of Financial Studies, 17 (1), pp. 
165-206. 
Tan, L., Chiang, T.C., Mason, J.R., Nelling, E. (2008), “Herding Behavior in Chinese Stock 
Markets: an examination of A and B shares”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 16, pp.61-
77. 
Theriou, N., Mlekanis, G., Maditionos, D. (2011), “Herding by mutual fund managers in 
the Athens Stock Exchange”, European Research Studies, XIV(4), 142-154.  
Wermers, R. (1999), “Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices”, Journal of 
Finance, 54, pp. 581-622. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
  
33 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1 – Data on Euronext Index in 2015 
Market Total market capitalization 
(million euros)  
Weight of top 10 stocks (%) 
Lisbon (PSI 20) 50,541.55 90.47 
France (CAC 40) 1,244,411.86 52.58 
Belgium (BEL 20) 365,614.56 82.72 
Amesterdam (AEX) 485,168.98 78.43 
Source: Euronext, Key Index Facts on 31 Dec 2015.  
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Table 2- Regression results of the CSSD model 
Panel A 
Average Returns 
  
Criteria 1% 
   
Criteria 5% 
 
  
α 
 
βL 
 
βU 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
  
α 
 
βL 
 
βU 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
 
PSI GERAL 
 
0,0260*** 
(49,04) 
 
0.0178*** 
(9,74) 
 
0.0236*** 
(7.30) 
 
 
0,05 
  
0.0249*** 
(51,25) 
 
0.0151*** 
(10,42) 
 
0.0152*** 
(10,24) 
 
 
      0,12 
PSI 20 0.0147*** 
(57,82) 
0.0123*** 
(5.52) 
0.0155*** 
(8.4) 
 
0,08 
 0.0140*** 
(62,55) 
0.0090*** 
(10.67) 
0.0102*** 
(10.71) 
 
       0,16 
PSI 
FINANCIALS 
0.0153*** 
(36.17) 
0.0214*** 
(10.59) 
0.0340*** 
(8.56) 
 
0,12 
 0.0140*** 
(38.88) 
0.0167*** 
(12.30) 
0.0200*** 
(13.14) 
 
0,23 
PSI 
INDUSTRIALS 
0.0276*** 
(38.89) 
0.0512*** 
(6.73) 
0.0708*** 
(10.13) 
 
0,14 
 0.0240*** 
(46.12) 
0.0470*** 
(10.35) 
0.0494*** 
(11.54) 
 
0,37 
PSI CONSUMER 
SERVICES 
0.0224*** 
(37.83) 
0.0503*** 
(6.02) 
0.0465*** 
(8.30) 
 
0,14 
 0.0203*** 
(39.57) 
0.0313*** 
(11.86) 
0.0306*** 
(13.53) 
 
0,27 
Panel B 
Weighted 
Returns 
 
Criteria 1% 
   
Criteria 5% 
 
  
𝜶 
 
βL 
 
βU 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
  
𝜶 
 
βL 
 
βU 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
 
PSI GERAL 
 
 
0.0267*** 
(48,48) 
 
0.0182*** 
(6.94) 
 
0.0197*** 
(6,81) 
 
 
0,04 
  
0.0258*** 
(48,56) 
 
0.0131*** 
(9.54) 
 
0.0129*** 
(10.01) 
 
 
0,08 
PSI 20 0.0152*** 
(57,13) 
0.0121*** 
(5,28)  
0.0151*** 
(6,97) 
 
0,07 
 0.0146*** 
(60.93)  
0.0084*** 
(10.57)  
0.0100*** 
(9.70) 
 
0,14 
PSI 
FINANCIALS 
0.0167*** 
(37,60) 
0.0373*** 
(6,70)  
0.0384*** 
(9,43)  
 
0,18 
 0.0155*** 
(37.98)  
0.0183*** 
(11.03)  
0.0210*** 
(12.74)  
 
0,22 
PSI 
INDUSTRIALS 
0.0300*** 
(34.98)  
0.0132*** 
(4,62)  
0.0338*** 
(4.95)  
 
0,02 
 0.0274*** 
(32.63)  
0.0114*** 
(4,73)  
0.0120*** 
(4,48)  
 
0,02 
PSI CONSUMER 
SERVICES 
0.0248*** 
(35.32) 
0.0316*** 
(6.61)  
0.0307*** 
(9.25)  
 
0,05 
 0.0232*** 
(35.82)  
0.0234*** 
(9.75)  
0.0219*** 
(10.38)  
 
0,13 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (3). Coefficients are estimated with the Newey-West methodology.  
*** Statistically significant  at 1%. (t-stat).  
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Table 3 - Regression results of the CSSD model with GARCH method and weighted 
returns 
Panel A  
Autocorrelation test and 
Heteroscedasticity  
(F-stat) p-value] 
 
 
Criteria 1% 
 
 
 
Criteria 5% 
 Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test  
 
ARCH LM Test  
Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test 
 
ARCH LM Test 
PSI GERAL 1.263 
[0.25] 
36.43*** 
[0.00] 
1.108 
[0.35] 
36.32*** 
[0.00] 
PSI 20 0.7921 
[0.64] 
0.9913 
[0.42] 
0.4692 
[0.91] 
0.6968 
[0.63] 
PSI FINANCIALS 0.9142 
[0.52] 
3.0824*** 
[0.01] 
0.6661 
[0.76] 
2.4246** 
[0.03] 
PSI INDUSTRIALS 0.9800 
[0.46] 
46.67*** 
[0.00] 
0.8866 
[0.55] 
47.71*** 
[0.00] 
PSI C. SERVICES 0.4340 
[0.93] 
13.35*** 
[0.00] 
0.7332 
[0.69] 
12.4732*** 
[0.00] 
Panel B 
The regression coefficients 
CSSD. (z-Stat) [p-value] 
 
Criteria 1% 
 
Criteria 5% 
 α βL βU 𝑹𝟐  α βL βU 𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
 
PSI GERAL 
0.0254*** 
(8.09) 
0.0112*** 
(4.19) 
0.0121*** 
(4.33) 
 
0,40 
0.0252*** 
(8.58) 
0.0064*** 
(5.74) 
0.0062*** 
(5.93) 
 
0,41 
PSI 20 - - - 
 
 - - -  
PSI FINANCIALS 0.0170*** 
(4.11) 
0.0362*** 
(5.65) 
0.0378*** 
(6.64) 
 
0,42 
-3.2294 
(-0.002) 
0.0144*** 
(5.75)  
0.0157*** 
(9.19) 
 
0,41 
PSI INDUSTRIALS 0.0311*** 
(5.90) 
0.0052 
(1.57) 
0.0195*** 
(4.29) 
 
0,12 
0.0307*** 
(5.34) 
0.0073*** 
(3.38) 
0.0073*** 
(3.83) 
 
0,12 
PSI C. SERVICES 11.3908 
(0.00) 
0.0331*** 
(6.02) 
0.0322*** 
(8.00) 
 
0,30 
2.2065 
(0.00) 
0.0175*** 
(6.37) 
0.0173*** 
(8.28) 
 
0,34 
Panel C 
Diagnostic test, 
 F-stat [p-value] 
 
Criteria 1% 
 
Criteria 5% 
 Ljung-Box 
Q-Statistics  
 
ARCH LM Test  
Ljung-Box 
Q-Statistics 
 
ARCH LM Test 
PSI GERAL [0.41] 1.08 
[0.37] 
[0.43] 1.3790 
[0.23] 
PSI 20 - - - - 
PSI FINANCIALS [0.97] 0.5556 
[0.73] 
[0.82] 0.1795 
[0.97] 
PSI INDUSTRIALS [0.13] 1.1445 
[0.33] 
[0.18] 1.2969 
[0.26] 
PSI C. SERVICES [0.19] 0.0457 
[0.99] 
[0.33] 0.1170 
[0.99] 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (3) modelling conditional variance with a GARCH model and 
eliminating autocorrelation by introducing AR and MA elements. Panel B coefficients are estimated using a GARCH 
model with the Bollerslev-Wooldridge methodology.  
*** 1% Significance. LM-Test (q)=10; ARCH LM (q)=5; Q-Stat (q)=10.  
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Table 4 – Regression results of the CSAD model  
Panel A 
Average Returns 
 
𝜶 
 
|𝑹𝒎,𝒕| 
 
(𝑹𝒎,𝒕)
𝟐
 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
 
PSI GERAL 
 
0.0101*** 
(46.39) 
 
0.8742*** 
(24.67) 
 
-5.0369*** 
(-6.05) 
 
 
0.49 
PSI 20 0.0080*** 
(49.81) 
0.3820*** 
(17.24) 
- 1.2899*** 
(-4.09) 
 
0.37 
PSI FINANCIALS 0.0060*** 
(25.16) 
0.7354*** 
(18.52)  
- 3.6668*** 
(-4.19) 
 
0.47 
PSI INDUSTRIALS 0.0071*** 
(18.32) 
1.2080*** 
(18.32) 
- 5.8980*** 
(-3.94) 
 
0.58 
PSI CONSUMER SERVICES 0.0081*** 
(17.87) 
1.0690*** 
(10.86) 
- 2.4691 
(-0.71) 
 
0.51 
Panel B 
Weighted Returns 
 
𝜶 
 
|𝑹𝒎.𝒕| 
 
(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
  
PSI GERAL 
 
0.0106*** 
(46.34) 
 
0.6793*** 
(26.51) 
 
- 2.3088*** 
(-5.81) 
 
 
0.51 
PSI 20 0.0082*** 
(47.92) 
0.3954*** 
(17.74) 
- 1.4077*** 
(-5.55) 
 
0.34 
PSI FINANCIALS 0.0070*** 
(24.24) 
0.5190*** 
(13.14) 
- 0.0724* 
(-0.08) 
 
0.53 
PSI INDUSTRIALS 0.0122*** 
(27.25) 
0.5485*** 
(11.74) 
-0.6718 
(-0.71) 
 
0.25 
PSI CONSUMER SERVICES 0.0101*** 
(25.24) 
0.7569*** 
(16.95) 
-1.9564** 
(-2.07) 
 
0.38 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (5).. coefficients are estimated with the Newey-West methodology. 
***. **. * Statistically significant at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively. (t-stat).  
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Table 5 - Regression results of the CSAD model on up market and down market   
Panel A 
Average 
Returns 
 
 𝒂 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷|𝑹𝒎.𝒕
𝑼𝑷 | 
 
(𝟏
− 𝑫𝑼𝑷)|𝑹𝒎.𝒕| 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
(𝟏
− 𝑫𝑼𝑷)(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
𝑹𝟐 
Equality of 
coefficients 
𝑫𝑼𝑷(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
=  
(𝟏
− 𝑫𝑼𝑷)(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
PSI GERAL 
 
0.0101*** 
(46.01) 
0.8930*** 
(20.87) 
0.8788*** 
(22.96) 
-4.1510*** 
(-5.16) 
-6.0962*** 
(-6.78) 
 
0.50 
 
3.5526 
[0.0596] 
PSI 20 
 
0.0079*** 
(49.27) 
0.4298*** 
(16.82) 
0.3404*** 
(12.41) 
- 1.7589*** 
(-6.49) 
-0.6523 
(-0.94) 
 
0.38 
 
2.8666 
[0.0923] 
PSI 
FINANCIALS 
 
0.0059*** 
(24.58) 
0.8000*** 
(19.64) 
0.7383*** 
(15.17) 
- 3.4705*** 
(-4.96) 
-5.2200*** 
(-3.73) 
 
0.48 
 
1.6515 
[0.1986] 
PSI 
INDUSTRIALS 
 
0.0071*** 
(17.64) 
1.2192*** 
(12.54) 
1.1961*** 
(17.41) 
-4.1449 
(-1.39) 
-7.0175*** 
(-4.65) 
 
0.58 
 
1.0386 
[0.3083] 
PSI C. 
Services 
 
0.0080*** 
(19.25) 
1.1376*** 
(13.94) 
1.0218*** 
(9.08) 
-4.6254* 
(-1.64) 
-1.1147 
(-0.27) 
 
0.51 
 
0.7991 
[0.3714] 
Panel B 
Weighted 
Returns 
 
           𝒂 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷|𝑹𝒎.𝒕
𝑼𝑷 | 
 
(𝟏
− 𝑫𝑼𝑷)|𝑹𝒎.𝒕| 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
(𝟏
− 𝑫𝑼𝑷)(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
𝑹𝟐 
Equality of 
coefficients 
𝑫𝑼𝑷(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
=  
(𝟏
− 𝑫𝑼𝑷)(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
PSI GERAL 
 
0.0111*** 
(27.25) 
0.6319*** 
(11.78) 
0.6966*** 
(11.66) 
-1.7710** 
(-2.21) 
-3.1303*** 
(-3.81) 
 
0.18 
 
1.6973 
[0.1927] 
PSI 20 
 
0.0082*** 
(47.33) 
0.4185*** 
(16.26) 
0.3878*** 
(14.31) 
-1.3324*** 
(-4.21) 
-1.7413*** 
(-2.80) 
 
0.34 
 
0.3800 
[0.5376] 
PSI 
FINANCIALS 
 
0.0069*** 
(22.78) 
0.5787*** 
(15.70) 
0.4741*** 
(7.22) 
- 0.5718 
(-0.77) 
0.3301 
(0.18) 
 
0.53 
 
0.2679 
[0.6048] 
PSI 
INDUSTRIALS 
 
0.0147*** 
(24.10) 
0.2980*** 
(5.23) 
0.2815*** 
(4.21) 
1.1596 
(1.43) 
0.7078 
(0.52) 
 
0.07 
 
0.1049 
[0.7460] 
38 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (6). Coefficients are estimated with the Newey-West methodology.  
***. **. *  Statistically significant at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively. (t-stat). The last column presents the F-statistics for the 
Wald test of equality of coefficients – [.] is the p-value.  
 
 
Table 6 – Regression results of the CSAD model with GARCH method and during periods 
of extreme market movement 
Panel A 
Autocorrelation test and 
Heteroscedasticity (F-stat). [p-value] 
A1: Average Returns A2: Weighted Returns 
Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test 
ARCH 
LM Test 
Breusch-Godfrey 
LM Test 
ARCH 
LM Test 
PSI Geral 0.9064 
[0.53] 
21.75*** 
[0.00] 
1.0022 
[0.44] 
26.47 
[0.00] 
PSI 20 0.7097 
[0.72] 
4.29*** 
[0.00] 
0.8831 
[0.55] 
4.64 
[0.00] 
PSI FINANCIALS 1.2572 
[0.25] 
4.40*** 
[0.00] 
1.1724 
[0.30] 
2.65** 
[0.02] 
PSI INDUSTRIALS 
 
1.0935 
[0.36] 
12.18*** 
[0.00] 
1.0168 
[0.43] 
37.61 
[0.00] 
PSI CONSUMER SERVICES 0.1678 
[0.99] 
17.87*** 
[0.00] 
0.6347 
[0.79] 
8.88*** 
[0.00] 
Panel B 
Coefficients of 
regression  
(z-Stat) [p-value] 
 
 
B1: Average Returns 
 
B2: Weighted Returns 
 
𝜶 
 
|𝑹𝒎.𝒕| 
 
(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
 
𝜶 
 
|𝑹𝒎.𝒕| 
 
(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
PSI Geral 0.0111*** 
(9.82) 
0.5444*** 
(22.03) 
-1.4535** 
(-2.037) 
 
0.70 
0.114 
(8.43) 
0.4333*** 
(23.03) 
-0.2015 
(-0.49) 
 
0.72 
PSI 20 0.0083*** 
(14.04) 
0.2622*** 
(14.88) 
-0.5820 
(-1.32) 
 
0.56 
0.0085 
(14.59) 
0.2665 
(15.73) 
-0.6225* 
(-1.86) 
 
0.53 
PSI Financials 0.0067*** 
(6.93) 
0.5129*** 
(14.77) 
-0.4935 
(-0.46) 
 
0.58 
0.0069*** 
(8.09) 
0.4290*** 
(15.86) 
0.6189 
(0.95) 
 
0.62 
PSI Industrials 
 
0.0078*** 
(24.73) 
1.0644*** 
(22.17) 
-4.7489*** 
(-3.66) 
 
0.59 
0.0137*** 
(7.47) 
0.4605*** 
(4.98) 
-0.0864 
(-0.10) 
 
0.34 
PSI Consumer 
Services 
0.0053 
(1.4643) 
0.8883*** 
(12.61) 
-0.9212 
(-0.38) 
 
0.61 
0.0626 
(0.08) 
0.5597*** 
(13.30) 
0.2580 
(0.27) 
 
0.54 
Panel C 
Autocorrelation test and 
Heteroscedasticity. F-stat [p-value] 
C1: Average Returns C2: Weighted Returns 
Ljung-Box 
Q-Statistics 
ARCH 
LM Test 
Ljung-Box 
Q-Statistics 
ARCH 
LM Test 
PSI Geral [0.56] 
 
0.2235 
[0.95] 
[0.33] 0.9616 
[0.44] 
PSI 20 [0.63] 
 
0.4204 
[0.83] 
[0.40] 0.4946 
[0.78] 
PSI Financials 
 
[0.58] 
 
0.1580 
[0.98] 
[0.36] 0.2183 
[0.95] 
PSI Industrials 
 
[0.79] 
 
0.2595 
[0.94] 
[0.28] 1.4395 
[0.21] 
PSI C. 
SERVICES 
 
0.0101*** 
(25.18) 
0.7740*** 
(16.63) 
0.7311*** 
(12.45) 
-1.6899* 
(-1.72) 
-1.9397 
(-1.46) 
 
0.38 
 
0.040 
[0.8410] 
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PSI Consumer services [0.78] 
 
0.4661 
 [0.80] 
[0.59] 0.3018 
[0.91] 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (5) modelling conditional variance with a GARCH model and 
eliminating autocorrelation by introducing AR and MA elements. Panel B. GARCH model consistent with the Bollerslev-
Wooldridge methodology. ***.**.* significant 1%. 5% and 10%. LM-Test (q)=10; ARCH LM (q)=5; Q-Stat (q)=10.  
 
Table 7 – Estimation results of the CSAD model with GARCH method. during periods of 
extreme market movement. and with weighted returns 
Panel A 
Autocorrelation and 
Heteroscedasticity 
F-stat [p-value] 
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
 LM Test 
 
ARCH 
 LM Test 
PSI GERAL 1.1979 
[0.29] 
27.82 
[0.00] 
PSI 20 0.8937 
[0.54] 
4.66*** 
[0.00] 
PSI FINANCIALS 1.207 
[0.28] 
2.36** 
[0.04] 
PSI INDUSTRIALS 1.0002 
[0.44] 
  38.17*** 
[0.00] 
PSI C. SERVICES 0.6460 
[0.78] 
8.94 
    [0.00]*** 
Panel B 
The regression coefficients  
(z-Stat) [p-value] 
 
 𝒂 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷|𝑹𝒎.𝒕
𝑼𝑷 | 
 
(𝟏 − 𝑫𝑼𝑷)|𝑹𝒎.𝒕| 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
(𝟏 − 𝑫𝑼𝑷)(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
PSI GERAL 
 
0.0113** 
(8.34) 
0.4723*** 
(21.35) 
0.4095*** 
(20.67) 
-0.2395 
(-0.47) 
- 0.4885 
(-1.07) 
 
0.72 
PSI 20 
 
0.0085*** 
(14.29) 
0.2980*** 
(16.22) 
0.2606*** 
(9.79) 
- 0.6322** 
(-2.42) 
-1.1400 
(-1.29) 
 
0.53 
PSI FINANCIALS 
 
0.0070*** 
(7.79) 
0.4853*** 
(14.87)] 
0.3720*** 
(10.07) 
0.1248 
(0.20) 
1.1417 
(0.35) 
 
0.63 
PSI INDUSTRIALS 
 
0.0138*** 
(5.28) 
0.4793*** 
(11.37) 
0.4354*** 
(8.01) 
0.6986 
(0.64) 
-0.5455 
(-0.40) 
 
0.34 
PSI C. SERVICES 
 
0.5585 
(0.01) 
0.4663*** 
(9.24) 
0.4441*** 
(7.89) 
3.9064** 
(2.33) 
2.0740 
(1.50) 
 
0.53 
Panel C 
Diagnostic tests 
 F-stat [p-value] 
 
Ljung-Box  
Q-Statistics 
 
ARCH 
 LM Test 
PSI GERAL [0.16] 1.5437 
[0.17] 
PSI 20 [0.45] 1.0550 
[0.39] 
PSI FINANCIALS [0.26] 0.1423 
[0.98] 
PSI INDUSTRIALS [0.44] 0.6044 
[0.70] 
PSI C. SERVICES [0.59] 0.1798 
[0.97] 
40 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (6) modelling conditional variance with a GARCH model and 
eliminating autocorrelation by introducing AR and MA elements. Panel B. GARCH model consistent with the Bollerslev-
Wooldridge methodology.  ***.**.* significant 1%. 5% and 10%. LM-Test (q)=10; ARCH LM (q)=5; Q-Stat (q)=10.  
 
  
Table 8- Estimation results for the CSAD model. with GARCH method. in up market and 
down market. and with weighted returns. 
Panel A 
Autocorrelation and 
Heteroscedasticity 
F-stat [p-value] 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test 
 
 
ARCH LM Test 
Portfolio 1 0.9853 
[0.45] 
15.83 
[0.00] 
Portfolio 2 1.3630 
[0.19] 
10.88 
[0.00] 
Portfolio 3 1.1104 
[0.35] 
5.42 
[0.00] 
Panel B 
The regression 
coefficients  
(z-Stat) [p-value] 
 
 𝒂 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷|𝑹𝒎.𝒕
𝑼𝑷 | 
 
(𝟏 − 𝑫𝑼𝑷)|𝑹𝒎.𝒕| 
 
𝑫𝑼𝑷(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
(𝟏 − 𝑫𝑼𝑷)(𝑹𝒎.𝒕)
𝟐 
 
𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
Portfolio 1 0.0142*** 
(10.87) 
0.8133*** 
(24.30) 
0.7076*** 
(19.75) 
-0.9547* 
(-1.66) 
-0.2288 
(-0.24) 
 
0.62 
Portfolio 2 0.0086*** 
(4.09) 
0.8713*** 
(25.82) 
0.6393*** 
(14.16) 
-5.3559*** 
(-4.67) 
-1.8112 
(-1.14) 
 
0.61 
Portfolio 3 0.0080*** 
(12.16) 
0.3326*** 
(16.22) 
0.2819*** 
(9.73) 
-0.8154** 
(-1.97) 
-1.2043 
(-1.14) 
 
0.56 
Panel C 
Diagnostic tests 
 F-stat [p-value] 
 
Ljung-Box Q-Statistics 
 
ARCH LM Test 
Portfolio 1 [0.40] 1.08 
[0.37] 
Portfolio 2 [0.11] 0.53 
[0.74] 
Portfolio 3 [0.46] 0.34 
[0.89] 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (6) modelling conditional variance with a GARCH model and 
eliminating autocorrelation by introducing AR and MA elements. Panel B. GARCH model consistent with the Bollerslev-
Wooldridge methodology.  
***.**.* significant 1%. 5% e 10%. LM-Test (q)=10; ARCH LM (q)=5; Q-Stat (q)=10.  
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Table 9- Summary of the results for the non-linear model. 
 Nonlinear model of Herding Behavior analysis 
 Panel A: Average Returns Panel B: Weighted Returns  
 OLS 
 
GARCH OLS 
 
GARCH 
(5) (6) (5) (6) (5) (6) (5) (6) 
UP Down UP Down UP Down Up Down 
PSI Geral HB*** HB*** HB*** HB **   HB*** HB** HB***    
PSI 20 HB *** HB***   HB***  HB*** HB*** HB*** HB* HB**  
PSI Financials HB *** HB*** HB***    HB**      
PSI Industrials HB ***  HB*** HB ***  HB***       
PSI C.Services   HB*     HB** HB*     
  
Portfolio 1 HB***  HB***  HB*  HB*** HB** HB***  HB*  
Portfolio 2 HB*** HB*** HB*** HB*** HB***  HB*** HB*** HB*** HB*** HB***  
Portfolio 3 HB*** HB*** HB***  HB***  HB*** HB*** HB***  HB**  
Notes: ***. **. * Statistically significant at 1%. 5% and 10% respectively. HB-Herding Behavior.  (5) – Regression (5) 
 (6) – Regression (6).  
 
 
 
  
42 
 
 
Table 10 – Estimation results for the CSAD model. with GARCH method. and with 
dummies for the suprime and sovereign debt crises (regression (7)) 
Panel A 
Autocorrelation and 
Heteroscedasticity.  F-stat  [p-value] 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 
Test 
ARCH LM  
Test 
PSI 20 0.7877 
[0.65] 
3.71*** 
[0.00] 
P 1 1.3394 
[0.20] 
46.42*** 
[0.00] 
P 2 1.1728 
[0.30] 
10.49*** 
[0.00] 
P 3 0.8708 
[0.56] 
2.68** 
[0.02] 
Panel B 𝛂 𝛄𝟏 𝛄𝟐 𝛄𝟑 𝛄𝟒 𝛄𝟓 𝛄𝟔 𝛄𝟕 𝛄𝟖 𝑹𝟐̅̅̅̅  
PSI20 0.008*** 
(16.01) 
0.248*** 
(11.25) 
0.202*** 
(7.24) 
5.973*** 
(3.05) 
1.243 
(0.87) 
-6.945*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.696 
(-0.53) 
-6.323*** 
(-3.50) 
-1.736 
(-1.36) 
 
0.56 
P 1 0.010* 
(1.85) 
0.859*** 
(10.48) 
0.930*** 
(10.91) 
12.50*** 
(2.83) 
3.917 
(0.89) 
-3.691 
(-0.69) 
-9.361*** 
(-2.74) 
-5.681 
(-0.91) 
-0.868 
(0.36) 
 
0.76 
P 2 0.009*** 
(2.83) 
0.841*** 
(16.60) 
0.618*** 
(13.28) 
-2.818 
(-0.88) 
-2.328 
(-1.20) 
-3.460 
(-1.18) 
0.827 
(0.46) 
-5.729* 
(-1.67) 
2.121 
(0.96) 
 
0.64 
P 3 0.008*** 
(13.60) 
0.294*** 
(11.35) 
0.252*** 
(7.89) 
6.176*** 
(2.51) 
0.773 
(0.45) 
-7.573*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.520 
(-0.32) 
-5.499** 
(-2.09) 
-1.073 
(0.70) 
 
0.58 
Wald Test: t-stat p-value 
PSI 20: 
𝐻0: 𝛾3 + 𝛾5 = 0 
𝐻0: 𝛾3 + 𝛾7 = 0 
Portfolio 1 
𝐻0: 𝛾4 + 𝛾6 = 0 
Portfolio 2 
𝐻0: 𝛾3 + 𝛾7 = 0 
Portfolio 3: 
𝐻0: 𝛾3 + 𝛾5 = 0 
𝐻0: 𝛾3 + 𝛾7 = 0 
 
-3.3520 
-1.0904 
 
-2.5080 
 
-3.3139 
 
-3.1451 
0.4269 
 
[0.00] 
[0.28] 
 
[0.01] 
 
[0.00] 
 
[0.00] 
[0.67] 
Panel C 
Diagnostic tests. F-stat [p-value] 
        Ljung-Box 
       Q-Statistics 
ARCH 
LM Test 
PSI 20 [0.49] 0.36 
[0.88] 
Portfolio 1 [0.11] 1.22 
[0.30] 
Portfolio 2 [0.57] 1.42 
[0.22] 
Portfolio 3 [0.42] 0.17 
[0.97] 
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation (7) modelling conditional variance with a GARCH model and 
eliminating autocorrelation by introducing AR and MA elements. Panel B. GARCH model. consistent with the  Bollerslev-
Wooldridge methodology.  ***.**.* significant 1%. 5% and 10%. LM-Test (q)=10; ARCH LM (q)=5; Q-Stat (q)=10.  
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Graph 1 – Evolution of PSI 20 
 
Source: Datis database. 
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